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RECENT DECISIONS

TORT LAw-VIOLATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE STATUTE MAY

GIVE RISE To ABSOLUTE LIABILITY-A fourteen year old student was fatally injured by an automobile which struck him as
he negligently crossed a highway a short distance from where he
had been discharged by the driver of defendant's school bus. Although the driver was aware that the child would have to cross
the highway, she failed to keep the vehicle halted with signal lights
flashing or to instruct him to cross in front of the bus as required
by Section 1174(b) of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law.
On appeal by plaintiff from an adverse judgment in the wrongful
death action, the New York Court of Appeals held that if on a
new trial it could be shown that the violation of the statute was
the proximate cause of the injury, defendant school district would
be absolutely liable and the contributory negligence of decedent
would not bar recovery. Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuch Central
School District No. 1, 21 N.Y.2d 239, 234 N.E.2d 243, 287
N.Y.S.2d 77 (1968).
It is only in the last century that negligence has received recognition as an independent basis for tort liability.' Negligence,
possibly more than any other legal theory, reflects the philosophy
and pulse of an age that has 2tested and eliminated rash or impractical burdens of responsibility.
As the body of actionable wrongs has evolved, one important
development has been the creation of statutory standards of care.
In many instances, codification has been a cursory adoption of
common-law standards, while in others duties unknown at common
law have been imposed. However, the court "may assume that a
'liability' is not 'created' by statute in every case where the statute
imposes a new duty or a standard of care different from that
required by custom and common law." 3 One major problem
created by these statutes in derogation of the common law is
whether violation of such a statute is negligence per se, i.e., as a
matter of law, or whether it is merely some evidence of negligence
to be submitted to the jury.4 This conflict may be characterized
'See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 28 (3d ed. 1964); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359, 365-76
(1951); Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42
Perhaps the first recovery for negligence in the
L.Q. REv. 184 (1926).
United States was Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cuch.) 292 (1850).
2 See Comment, The Development of New York Negligence Law, 30
FoRDHAm L. Rav. 325 (1961), for a discussion of five recent developments
which demonstrate New York's changing concept of negligence recovery.
-Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 304, 200
N.E. 824, 829 (1936).
4 A major criticism of the negligence per se rule has been that it
introduces an inflexibility into the law which is undesirable since the
legislature cannot take into account all the varying circumstances of a
particular violation and the resultant accident. Professor James has stated
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as one in which those advocating fault as the basis for liability
attempt to strike down any inflexible standard, while those whose
chief concern is the compensation of accident victims opt for stricter
rules of liability.9
The majority of American jurisdictions, including New York,"
have adopted the negligence per se rule. Nevertheless, liability is
not witl6ut limitation. Proximate cause 8 and lack of contributory
negligence 9 remain conditions precedent to recovery, and further
qualifications have circumscribed inflexible application of the rule.
Thus, for example, statutory violations have been excused where
the person injured was not a member of the protected class,' 0
where there was customary violation of the statute,'1 and where the
statute was unreasonable on its face or as applied, such as when
compliance would be impossible,' 2 or where there was an emergency. 3 Also, there are frequently situations where the wisdom of
obeying a statute is weighed against its prudent violation and it
can be found that obedience is the negligent course.'
Moreover,
that "it is unrealistic and mechanical to say that reasonable men would
blindly obey all the regulatory statutes under all circumstances, and to
deprive the jury of its usual and historic function in negligence cases."
James, Statutory Standard and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L.
REv. 95, 108 (1950).
For further discussion of the controversy see Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINiN. L. REv.
361, 368-70 (1932); Comment, Negligence Per Se-Traffic Violations, 30
TENN. L. REv. 556, 565-67 (1963).
5 See generally Comment, Negligence Per Se-Traffic Violations, 30
TmNx. L. REv. 556 (1963).
I2 F. HARPER & F. JAmES, TORTS § 17.6 (1956); W. PRossER, supra
note 1, at § 35.
7 Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920).
8 See, e.g., Falk v. Finkelman, 268 Mass. 89, 168 N.E. 89 (1929)
(illegal parking held not to be the cause of injury to pedestrian when fire
truck collided with parked car); Marland Ref. Co. v. Duffy, 94 Okla. 16,
220 P. 846 (1923).
9 Prosser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation of Statute,
32 MINN. L. REv. 105, 113 (1948).
10Di Caprio v. New York Cent R-R., 231 N.Y. 94, 131 N.E. 746
(1921), where a statute requiring railroad right of way to be fenced was
construed as designed to protect the owners of domestic animals from loss.
Therefore, plaintiff could not recover for the wrongful death of his child
who had wandered onto defendant railroad's unfenced tracks.
1 Dugan v. Fry, 34 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1929).
2Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851
(1946).
"1Chase v. Tingdale Bros., 127 Minn. 401, 149 N.W. 654 (1914).
'4 Phillips v. Davis, 3 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1925) (compliance with autoheadlight dimmer ordinance negligent where conditions dictated use of
bright beams); Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1939)
(failure of pedestrians to obey statute requiring that they walk against
traffic not negligence where traffic conditions made compliance imprudent);
Walker v. Lee, 115 S.C. 495, 106 S.E. 682 (1929) (driving on wrong side
of road not negligence where compliance with statute would have certainly
caused collision).
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in some jurisdictions there is a trend to confine negligence per se
to statutes and regard breaches of ordinances as evidence of negligence only.' 5
Despite a liberal trend 6 with respect to the application of the
negligence per se rule, there are situations in which an even stricter
standard of liability has been applied, i.e., where the violation of
a statute gives rise to absolute liability. The cases imposing
absolute liability are primarily limited to the areas of labor law
and child employment. The courts have consistently stated that,
for the violation of a statute to impose absolute liability, the statute
must be intended to protect a definite class of persons from a7
definable hazard which they are themselves unable to avoid.'
However, to articulate the standard is less difficult than to apply it,
and these criteria do not appear precise enough to allow one to
easily distinguish such statutes. The language of statutes which
have been held to give rise to absolute liability often do not themselves appear to mandate that result when compared with statutes
which have been construed otherwise. Therefore, the rationale for
finding that a particular statute imposes absolute liability for its
violation must apparently be sought elsewhere, perhaps in the social
policy underlying its enactment.2s
In Karpeles v. Heine,19 plaintiff, a child of thirteen, was injured while operating an elevator in violation of New York's
Labor Law 25 which prohibited such operation by anyone under
sixteen. Rejecting the defense of contributory negligence, the
Court stated that "[p] ublic policy requires that a recovery ...

shall

not be defeated by the very negligence, lack of care and caution that
the statute was designed to prevent and make impossible, by prohibiting the employment of such a child in such a capacity."21 The
Court did not consider the age of the child alone, however, but
stressed the dangers of the undertaking and the risks of employment in such occupations as well.
It is not merely youth which makes it difficult to appreciate
danger. It may be the character of the hazard itself. Thus, in
Schmidt v.

Merchants Despatch Transportation Ca.,22 absolute

'5Rotter v. Detroit United Ry., 205 Mich. 212, 171 N.W. 514 (1919);
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mancini & Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 116, 192 N.Y.S.2d
87 (4th Dep't 1959) (dictum).
16 James, Statutory Standard and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11
For a prediction of the trend in the future see
LA. L. Rm. 95 (1950).
Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv.

359, 396-97 (1951).

1 Keonig v. Patrick Constr, Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 317, 83 N.E.2d 133,
134 (1948), citing RESTATEMRNT oF TORTS §483 (1934).
18 Prosser, supra note 9, at 122.
'9227 N.Y. 74, 124 N.E. 101 (1919).
20 N.Y. LAB. LA-w § 133(3).
21 227 N.Y. at 80, 124 N.E. at 103.
22270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ Vor. 43

liability for injuries to employees was imposed on an employer
who failed to provide air filtration equipment of a capacity required
by statute. The Court stated that the legislature had determined
that defendant must shoulder the special responsibilities of being an
employer, and that his conduct would not be judged in terms of
the traditional reasonable man standard. Apparently underlying
this rationale was the judgment that someone must accept hazardous employment, and it is society's obligation to help minimize
the risks. Therefore, if the defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk were available to an employer, such a
statute would be ineffective as an incentive for employers to minimize job hazards. Without such an interpretation, the only alternatives available to a workman faced with dangerous conditions would
be to quit his job or depend upon ineffective penal sanctions for
employer non-compliance.
These alternatives were discussed in Koenig v. Patrick Construction Corp.,23 where the Court found the plaintiff was faced
with the necessity of working with the equipment supplied by the
employer or not working at all. New York Labor Law Section
240 provided that someone employing or directing another to perform labor, or repair or clean a building, must furnish ladders which
have "safety shoes" to prevent slippage. The plaintiff, who himself
had placed the improperly equipped ladder against the window,
was thrown. from it and injured when it slipped. The Court held
that contributory negligence was not a proper consideration with
statutes of this content and purpose, even though the danger of
using such a ladder was easily foreseen and the plaintiff had been
found contributorily negligent by the jury. It was further contended that the statutory language, "shall furnish," imposed a flat
and unvarying duty on employers. The Court did not, however,
explain how this statute differed from others imposing obligations
upon employers in substantially identical terms. Rather, it relied
on the principle that the plaintiff was an employee, a member of a
specific class that needed special protection, and that the statute
had to be liberally construed to accomplish its intended purpose.
The Court indicated the limitations of such a construction and
indicated that the statute would not be construed to impose absolute
liability if the ladder had hit a passerby, or even another workman,
since such persons would be outside the class for whose special
benefit the statute was designed.
By 1963, the rationale in the labor area had become sufficiently

clear to allow the court, in Galbraith v. Pike & Son, Inc., 24 where

an employee fell to his death from a ladder not meeting statutory
specifications, to tersely state: "In this situation, the statute is
23298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948). See also Major v. Waverly
& Ogden, Inc., 7 N.Y.2d 332, 165 N.E.2d 181, 197 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1960).
24

18 App. Diy. ?d 39, 238 N.Y.S.2d 263 (4th Dep't 1963).
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plainly applicable to [the defendant] and he is subject to absolute
liability for any violation ... ." 25
However, even in the labor area there is evidence that the
imposition of absolute liability is not without limit. In Utica
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mancini & Sons, 26 plaintiff's assignor
was injured when an improperly shored-up trench collapsed around
him. The court held that the violation of the safety rules of the
Board of Standards and Appeals 27 neither created absolute liability
nor constituted negligence per se, but was to be considered evidence of negligence only. Although the Labor Law provided that
"rules and regulations of the Commission shall have the force and
effect of law and shall be enforced in the same manner ... ,,28
the court reasoned that the mere legislative declaration that a rule
of a delegated body should have the same effect as law was not a
strong indication that absolute liability was to be imposed. Therefore, the workman's contributory negligence was a proper element
for consideration even though the rationale that a particular class
was being protected from a readily definable hazard still seemed
applicable.
The reluctance of the courts to extend the doctrine of absolute
liability beyond the labor and child employment areas is illustrated
by the decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Dart v.
Pure Oil Co.2 9

There, a can of gasoline, improperly labeled kero-

sene in violation of state statutes, exploded and killed the plaintiff's
deceased. After extensive consideration, the court held that the
statute was for the protection of the general public and not for the
plaintiff as a member of any special class. Therefore, contributory
negligence was available as a defense to the action.

25Id. at 43, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 267. It is interesting to compare the 19th
century laissez-faire attitude expressed by the New York Court of Appeals
in Knisley v. Pratt, 148 N.Y. 372, 42 N.E. 986 (1896), which refused to
construe an employee safety statute to impose absolute liability. The Court
was of the opinion that it would be unwise to adopt such a policy which
would have the effect of depriving an employee of the opportunity of taking
a job with obvious risks in order to obtain increased wages, or of securing
a job in the first place in a field others might not be willing to enter.
This trend, as noted, has obviously changed. The imposition of absolute
liability coincides historically with the other extreme measures that were
necessary to afford men humane and safe working conditions.
269 App. Div. 2d 116, 192 N.Y.S.2d 87 (4th Dep't 1959).
27 The Board of Standards and Appeals has the power to provide standards for the protection of workmen under Section 241 of the New York
Labor
Law.
2
sN.Y. LAB. LAw § 241.
29323 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555 (1947).
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In support of the Dart decision, Dean Prosser has stated:
In nearly all automobile cases, in nearly all railway cases, in many
street railway cases, in many cases arising out of the condition of
premises or the sale of goods or fires or explosions or unusual events
of any kind, the action is founded upon the defendant's violation of a
statute. In fact it is safe to say that today negligence actions are very
much in the minority in which there is not some claim of violation of
a statute, ordinance or regulation. Viewed in this light the contention
[that absolute liability should be adopted] was no less than a challenge
to the entire doctrine of contributory negligence and a proposal for its
abolition in the majority of negligence cases. 30
Furthermore, he indicated that when the legislature adopts a standard of care, an examination will usually reveal that it is merely an
extension of common-law negligence. For example, even absent a
statute, driving on the right side of the road would be the accepted
standard of care.31 Rarely is the nature of the wrong changed
by codification. The legislature merely removes any doubts as to
what negligent conduct might be. When the legislature goes beyond
existing law, one should look to the area of tort liability it most
closely resembles and probably it will be apparent that it is just a
natural development of reasonable standards. As for the contention
that the plaintiff in Dart was of a class unable to exercise selfprotective care, Dean Prosser noted that such cases are usually
limited to statutes fixing the age of consent and child labor acts.
Here there is strong legislative intent found by the courts to
impose strict liability. This intent is found from the particular
hazards and social problems being dealt with and from the very
character and obvious purpose of the statute. Social conditions,
extreme hazards, and the concept that "the cost of the product shall
bear the blood of the workman" have shaped the exceptions.
In Major v. Waverly & Ogden, Inc., 2 it is arguable that the
statute breached tended to protect a particular class of persons
from a hazard they could do little to avoid. There, the defendant had failed to provide adequate lighting and a handrail on a
stairway as provided in the state building code. 33 The plaintiff,
who had been watching television while at a friend's home, got up
"in a rush" to go to the bathroom but opened the wrong door by
mistake, stepped into the improperly lighted hallway and plunged
down a flight of stairs. It could not reasonably be said, thought

30 Prosser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation of Statute,

32 31
MINx. L. Rrv. 105, 106 (1948).
1d. at 110.
327 N.Y.2d 332, 165 N.E.2d 181, 197 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1960).
33
N.Y. E.XECuTr LAw §§ 374-374(a).
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the Court, that the statute disclosed an intent to create liability
where none heretofore existed. In the Court's opinion, the primary
purpose of the statute "was not to impose an unvarying duty for
the protection of a particular class against a defined hazard" but
rather to provide performance standards "thereby reducing excessive construction costs which the Legislature found threatened 'the
health, safety, welfare, comfort and security of the people of the
state.'" 3
The Court showed reluctance to go beyond general standards
of negligence and impose absolute liability.
Were we to hold otherwise in this case, and fashion the liability for
which plaintiff contends, we would be setting precedent for manifold
statutory liabilities not only as to violations of the Executive Law but
as to violations of countless other statutes as well, such as by way of
illustration, the Vehicle and Traffic Law. There would be danger
indeed that our common law of negligence would be substantially
recast.33

The cases involving injuries to children while under the supervision of school authorities have usually applied common-law negligence standards, notwithstanding the accompanying violation of a
statute. In Otman v. Board of Education,3 6 it was declared that
a state statute acknowledging liability for negligence of a teacher
in the supervision of pupils did not depend on standards other than
common-law negligence and that a teacher was held only to the
same standard of care required of a prudent parent. Here, the
teacher's absence from the room at the time of the accident was
non-negligent and was not the proximate cause of the injury to
the plaintiff's eye by a thrown pencil.
More recently, in Decker v. Dundee Central School District,37
lack of playground supervision required by statute3 8 gave rise to
34 7 N.Y.2d at 335, 165 N.E.2d at 183, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 167. It might
be argued that the statute did not have as its sole objective the reduction
of costs but rather sought to allow cost reduction in a manner consistent
with reasonable health and safety standards. Section 374 of the New York
Eecutive Law provides that the Buildings Code Commissioner is authorized
to make rules and regulations relating to construction and installation of
equipment, including provisions for safety and sanitary conditions.
35 7 N.Y.2d at 335, 165 N.E.2d at 183, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
36300 N.Y. 306, 90 N.E.2d 474 (1949).
374 N.Y.2d 462, 151 N.E.2d 866, 176 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1958).
See also
Lopez v. City of New York, 4 App. Div. 2d 48, 163 N.Y.S.2d 562 (2d
Dep't 1957), aff'd mere., 4 N.Y.2d 731, 148 N.E.2d 909, 171 N.Y.S.2d 860
(1958) (injury to child in unsupervised swing area gave rise to common-law
negligence liability notwithstanding violation of statute).
38 N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 1709(16) provides, inter alia, that it should be the

duty of the Board of Education of every Union Free School' District to

"employ such persons as may be necessary to supervise, organize, conduct
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liability, but on common-law negligence grounds. There, a ten
year old girl was injured during school hours while jumping off
a bleacher in the school playground. There was no teacher supervision as required by Section 1709 of the Education Law.3 9 That
section is not a detailed description of what constitutes supervision
but states that "adequate supervision" must be provided. It is
interesting to note that the Court held that the complete lack of
supervision in this case constituted only negligence. Thus, the
violation of a statute which was apparently intended-as protection
for a limited class, i.e., school children, from their inability to protect themselves was not construed to effect absolute liability. This
type of case, thought the Court, was one in which contributory
negligence of the child is a proper consideration for the jury.40
At common law, absent governmental immunity, school districts
were bound to provide students with reasonably safe conditions
under which to study. 41 Transportation is merely a natural extension of what the school districts feel they should provide to children
as society advances and becomes more complex. However, as the
school district assumes greater responsibility, it must do so with
42
McDonald v. Central School District Na. 3 RomulhIs
care.
contains an interesting discussion of both statutory duty and common-law negligence. An action was initiated against the bus driver
and the school district for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while
crossing in front of a school bus. The statutory predecessor of
Section 1174 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law required
that a school bus halted for the discharge of children remain standing with signal lights flashing until they crossed in front of the
bus and safely reached the opposite side of the street and that an
overtaking automobile stop behind a standing school bus. However,
the bus driver failed to make sure that an overtaking vehicle had
halted before signaling the children to cross, and one child was
injured when the driver of the auto failed to stop. Although liability of the school district might have been predicated solely on
and maintain athletic, playground and social center activities. . . ." This
has long been construed to impose a duty to supervise. See Miller v. Board
of Educ., 291 N.Y. 25, 50 N.E.2d 529 (1943).
30
N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 1709(16).
40In order that a child not be contributorily negligent in New York,
he must only exercise the degree of care which is reasonable for a child
of similar experience and intelligence under the circumstances. Camardo
v. New York State Ry., 247 N.Y. 111, 159 N.E. 879 (1928).
However,
where an infant is held non sui juris, his failure to meet the standard will
not bar recovery. See generally 41 N.Y. Jun. Negligence §§65-67 (1965).
41See Annot., 86 A.L.R. 2d 535-38 (1962).
42 179 Misc. 333, 39 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd inemn., 264 App.
Div. 943, 36 N.Y.S.2d 438 (4th Dep't 1942), aff'd inem., 289 N.Y. 800,
47 N.E.2d 50 (1943).
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the employee's breach of the statutory duty of care, 43 the court
relied on the jury's finding that the bus driver had been negligent
in not anticipating that the approaching car would fail to stop.
Liability was based on the unreasonableness of the bus driver's
reliance upon the fictitious assumption that the driver of the other
car would obey the law.
In the principal case, the defendant's bus driver violated
Section 1174(b) of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law.
Plaintiff's deceased and his companion were not instructed to cross
in front of the halted bus although the driver knew they had to
cross the highway. Instead, the bus pulled away and the children
were left to cross the road on their own. Since the school district's
negligence had been established and was not disputed,4 4 the Court
of Appeals considered the question of whether the fourteen year
old decedent's contributory negligence was available as a defense.
Judge Scileppi, joined by Judge Breitel, writing for the Court,45
noted that the doctrine of absolute liability has been applied most
often where there were violations of employee safety statutes and
conceded that "'obviously not every statute which commands particular conduct is within this principle.' " 4 The Court relied
heavily on the Koenig rule, 47 and reiterated that statutes "designed
to protect a definite class from a hazard of definable orbit, which
they themselves are incapable of avoiding," should give rise to
absolute liability. In analogizing the statute here to labor statutes
held to impose strict liability, the Court stated that the language
"shall instruct" evidenced an intent to impose a strict and unvarying duty. After noting the distinct considerations inherent in the
labor safety statutes, i.e., unavoidable hazards and lack of choice
due to the economic necessity of plying a livelihood, the Court
nevertheless thought it logical to extend absolute liability to the
transportation statute in question. Student bus riders comprise a
definite class which could be considered in need of protection from
themselves since they are not capable of taking the proper precau43 It is interesting to note that the McDonald court speculated as to
whether it would be safer to leave the children to their devices and allow
them to wait until the bus had driven away so that they could see the
traffic without obstruction. 179 Misc. at 336, 39 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
44The lower court had found, however, that the child's contributory
negligence was a defense to the common-law action against the driver of
the automobile which struck him, and that finding was not disturbed by the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal as to him.
45 It should be noted that the Court based its decision on absolute liability
for statutory violation despite the fact that only common-law negligence had
been pleaded. Relying on Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 209, 168 N.E.2d 654,
203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960), the Court stated that if a pleader states facts
making out a cause of action, it matters not whether he gives it a name.
46 21 N.Y. 2d at 244, 234 N.E.2d at 245, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 80 (1968).
4 Koenig v. Patrick Construction Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133
(1948) (discussed in text accompanying footnote 23).
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tions to cross a road safely. It is well known that children are
"unaware of and disregard dangers which are apparent to adults." 4
There was also an absence of choice since the Education Law
requires that children go to school until they are sixteen, and many
must travel by 'bus. Accordingly, the bus driver and the school
district were held absolutely liable and contributory negligence was
not available as a defense. Only the issue of proximate cause
was remanded to be determined at a new trial.
Judges Bergan and Keating concurred in part and dissented in
part without opinion, stating only that they would have also granted
a new trial as to the driver of the automobile which struck the
deceased.
In an opinion by Judge Van Voorhis, the three dissenters
agreed that absolute liability had been imposed in a limited class of
actions which were created by statute. However, the dissent urged
that they were not aware of one case involving motor vehicles and
pedestrians which had given rise to more than a cause of action in
negligence. It was noted that statutes commanding a duty of care
generally do not give rise to absolute liability unless such a provision is implied. Judge Van Voorhis thought that the majority's
view would make it easy to say that every time a statute prescribes
particular care it is enacted for the protection of a particular class,
be it motorists in a particular traffic situation or children and
adults crossing the street. The dissenters reasoned that the statute
was merely a codification of the school district's common-law responsibility to use reasonable care through its agents, which includes
adequate supervision and rules for the protection of the children.
Such a codification should not change the concept of liability but
should merely provide a standard by which negligence may be
determined. Finally, where the negligence standards are retained,
a child, in order to avoid contributory negligence, would only be
required to exercise that degree of care49 reasonably to be expected
for his age and degree of development.
The precise effect of the instant case on the attitude of the
New York courts toward construing statutes commanding a duty
of care to impose absolute liability is somewhat difficult to evaluate
due to the lack of written opinions from Judges Bergan and Keating. Both voted to reverse as to all defendants, apparently dissenting from the Court's determination that a new trial as to the driver
of the automobile would serve no useful purpose. However, since
no reasons were presented for their position, it is not clear to what
extent, if at all, these two judges agree that the absolute liability
doctrine is apposite here. There remains the possibility that some
unstated ground, such as an erroneous charge by the trial judge,
48 21
49

N.Y.2d at 245, 234 N.E.2d at 246, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
Id. at 249, 234 N.E.2d at 249, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
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motivated them to concur in ordering a new trial as to the bus
driver and the school district. Furthermore, since both sides of the
absolute liability issue were clearly articulated by the opposing
opinions, the failure of Judges Bergan and Keating to voice themselves on the question militates against confidently asserting that
they support the absolute liability rationale. Therefore, it is possible that only two judges on the Court of Appeals favor imposition of absolute liability for a violation of Section 1174(b) of the
Vehicle and Tnaffic Law, and one can only speculate on whether
the instant case truly marks a readiness on the part of the New
York Court of Appeals to expand the scope of the doctrine beyond
traditional areas of application.
The adoption of some means to insure that children can safely
cross the road on their way home from school is a natural extension of the attempt to provide safe transportation for school
children. However, this attempt has been construed as more than
just another undertaking to set a standard of care, and has become instead an undertaking to insure against all accidents, regardless of the contributing factors. Certainly it is commendable to
protect children from their own lack of judgment. However, the
economic and social implications which led to the imposition of
absolute liability in the labor law field are absent in the context
of student transportation. Protection of school children does not
spring from the foundation of inhumane and cruel working conditions that were an outgrowth of our industrial revolution. Is the
school district of such a nature that it must necessarily bear the
full liability for all student injuries? Employers, unlike school
districts, bear the losses of production since they can most easily
spread them. This prevents labor and our growing economy from
grinding to a halt in order to undertake the unrealistic and impossible task of removing all potential work hazards. It is the philosophy of the time that the injured workman be able to seek quick
and certain recovery from the inevitable accidents of production.
It is necessary. to retain flexibility in our labor force which is to
face the daily dangers. It is equally important, however, to retain
the flexible standard of negligence in most other areas of potential
liability so that the risk of economic loss will not outweigh the
possible rewards of otherwise socially productive action.
The rationale for changing the standard of liability in the
area of student transportation seems weak. First, the statutory
language appears too ambiguous a legislative directive to justify
destruction of the important defense of contributory negligence.
Second, the hazard to be avoided here appears no more precisely
defined than the hazard that faces all pedestrians and most children of the plaintiff's age the rest of the time that they are not
under the watchful eye of the school bus driver as they cross a
rural highway or bicycle along a country road. In short, the application of absolute liability in this area seems no more apposite
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than in other areas now governed by common-law negligence
theories.
What seems really at issue is the child's inability to protect
himself from the hazards of traffic. Is it, however, that a child
is unable to protect himself at all, or is it merely that he is unable
until reaching a certain age and degree of maturity? In the majority of instances, children might well be unable to safely cross unassisted and having the bus driver's aid is a reasonable alternative
to having older children help the younger ones or having mothers
meet the bus. However, it is one thing to say that a statute is
designed for the beneficial purpose of getting children home safely,
but quite another to say that where the statute is breached each
child should not exercise whatever caution seems reasonable for
his age. This is not a harsh request and will not in any way relieve
the school authorities of their duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect their charges. It merely asks that if a youth, be he fourteen or eighteen, finds himself in a position where it is necessary
to cross a highway, and is injured in so doing, the jury should
be allowed to decide if he took safety precautions in a manner
commensurate with his ability. It is submitted that where a child,
especially one of high school age, fails to exercise that degree of
care which is reasonably to be expected of him under the circumstances, it is inequitable to place the entire burden of that
failure on the school authority. Even as to younger children
there seems to be no reason to draw an arbitrary age line beyond
which no exercise of care can reasonably be expected. Rather
than treat the school district as an insurer, concepts of fault should
play a role in determining its liability.
Another danger of unnecessarily protecting a certain class is
the potential imposition of absolute liability for every breach of
a statutory duty. As Dean Prosser has noted, the imposition of
absolute liability in all but limited areas would be no less than
a challenge to our entire negligence standard. If absolute liability
is to be the consequence of violation of Section 1174(b) of the
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, it would seem logical to
extend the doctrine to at least all statutes which contemplate the
protection of school children from everyday hazards. This approach would seem to discredit the line of cases represented by
McDonald.50 Indeed, the logic of the instant case might well be
extended to cases involving violation of safety statutes by common
carriers who are already subject to a higher standard of care with
respect to their passengers than is usually required.
It may well be that the growing concern of our society with
the compensation of accident victims regardless of fault requires
50

McDonald v. Central School Dist. No. 3 Romulus, 289 N.Y. 800,
47 N.E.2d 50 (1943).
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that the traditional concept of contributory negligence as a bar to
recovery be discarded where the wrong complained of involves the
breach of a statutory standard of care. It certainly seems within
the province of the legislature to make such a judgment since it
is responsible for translating prevailing community values into
law. However, absent an unambiguous indication of legislative
intent to impose absolute liability, it is suggested that the courts
exercise caution before deciding to abandon traditional tort concepts. Possibly, a fourteen year old should be required to look
both ways before crossing an established highway. No less can
be expected of our courts.

